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Can the Sofa Speak?
A Look at Thing Theory
Things, edited by Bill Brown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp.
471. $49.50 cloth, $25.00 paper.
The Fugitive’s Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession, by Stephen M. Best.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. 362. $69.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.
Photographs Objects Histories: On the Materiality of Images, edited by Elizabeth
Edwards and Janice Hart. London: Routledge, 2004. Pp. xi + 222. $115.00 hardcover, $40.95 paper.
Things That Talk: Object Lessons from Art and Science, edited by Lorraine Daston.
New York: Zone Books (MIT Press), 2004. Pp. 447. $34.50 cloth.
I T USED TO BE THAT “living things” were mainly found in eighteenth-century
speaking-object narratives. Scholars interested in talkative objects might have
stretched a point to include late-nineteenth-century “commodity fetishes” and
horror films. No longer. What is coming to be called “thing theory” urges us to
take our account of “things that talk” as far back as Hieronymous Bosch monsters
(in Joseph Koerner’s persuasive “Bosch’s Equipment”), and as far afield as
Rorschach blots and the exemplary soap bubbles (anatomized in Simon Schaeffer’s “A Science Whose Business Is Bursting”) by which late Victorian physicists
demonstrated universal laws of molecular behavior to bedazzled audiences (both
articles appear in Lorraine Daston’s impressive new collection, Things That Talk).
Defining what one even means by talking about things can rapidly become an
arcane dispute, especially when waged by scholars quoting and counterquoting
Heidegger’s chewy phenomenological account of the “thingness of things.” But
ordinary language can provide some useful guidance here. Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s original subtitle for Uncle Tom’s Cabin, “The Man Who Was a Thing,” is
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meant to shock us far more than Uncle Tom’s merely being an object might (a person can be, after all, the “object of admiration” or “object of my affection”). And
Phil Harris’s chart-topping 1950 song about an unnamable horror that is indicated
only by an ominous drumming (e.g., “Get out of there with that—RAT-TAT-TAT—
and don’t come back no more”) was called “The Thing Song” for good reason.
“Thing” is far better than any other word at summing up imponderable, slightly
creepy what-is-it-ness. “Thing” is the term of choice for the extreme cases when
nouns otherwise fail us: witness the thingamagummy and the thingamabob.
Thing theory is at its best, therefore, when it focuses on this sense of failure, or
partial failure, to name or to classify. Thing theory highlights, or ought to highlight,
approaches to the margins—of language, of cognition, of material substance.
“Things” do not lie beyond the bounds of reason, to be sure (that would be absurd
or paradoxical, or flat out impossible), but at times they may seem to. That seeming is significant: these are limit cases at which our ordinary categories for classifying signs and substances, meaning and materiality, appear to break down.
Thing theory, then, is not a theory about the cultural significance of objects.
There is a familiar rationale for appraising evocative objects, the eloquent signifiers by which a culture makes itself known to itself. Anthropological discourse
has systematically refined that approach, with some selective importations and,
lately, more wholesale exportations of the concept, ever since Bronislaw Malinowski’s accounts of “ka” exchange in the Pacific Islands—Nicholas Thomas,
Marilyn Strathern, and Maurice Godelier being among the prime exporters. The
logical objection to such work is that it generally hears the objects saying nothing that the ambient culture has not carefully instilled. From Mauss to Strathern,
the aim has been to unpack what the culture meant objects to mean, rather than
to reflect on failures of meaning, or on the slippages that occur between the
intended meaning and the actually embodied substance of, let us say, a pair of
fighting cocks in Balinese hands. Clifford Geertz sees no such slippage when he
pins down the cock’s poetic associations in his memorable article on “Deep Play.”
We can fairly readily imagine what might be called an eco-critical or simply
anti-Enlightenment alternative to such a culturalist object theory, an objection
based on the thing’s capacity to speak for itself. In fact, Miguel Tamen’s Friends of
Interpretable Objects and Walter Michaels’s The Shape of the Signifier both take aim at
what can be called an “immanentist” scholarship that ardently desires things qua
things to speak to us, in some kind of mysterious yet comprehensible outsiders’ language. Is that kind of anti-semiotics the new core of thing theory? I think not. In
writing a review essay that covers three collections and one monograph, with a total
of forty-three authors, I only rarely encountered what Michaels and Tamen criticize—namely, a politically charged desire to speak for the inhuman world while
simultaneously proclaiming that world’s (that Nature’s?) inherent voicelessness.
If anything, I was struck in the books under review by a frequent return to a
more culturally circumscribed “object theory,” so leery are most scholars about
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venturing claims about what a “thing” at the very edge of cognition might be. So
it is, for example, that the essays in Photographs Objects Histories: On the Materiality of Images disavow ambitious theoretical manifestos in favor of a modest
account of “materiality” that licenses a set of small but productive claims about
the historicity of particular kinds of photography. With the exception of Geoffrey
Batchen’s contribution (discussed below), this collection’s dozen articles attempt
a delimited and cautious history of images as material objects. They explore what
sorts of meanings can be resurrected by attending not to hermeneutic analysis of
photographic images but rather to what they call photographs’ “ubiquitous materiality” or their “concrete embodied substance.” The claims in Nuno Porto’s
account of “Photographs and Performance in Colonial Angola” and Clare Harris’s
“Dynamics of Tibetan Relationships with Photography” or Richard Chalfen and
Mai Murui’s “Print Club Photography in Japan” all take on what might fairly be
called the diminished mission of object theory: to specify time, place, and people who might be tempted to give a particular set of objects a certain sort of life.
These, in other words, are objects that talk only because an enormous amount of
effort has been put into delineating the context, the interpretive community, in
which such speech can be heard.
Many of the best articles in Things and Things That Talk similarly attend to the
requirements of historicizing objects so that we can reconstruct what sort of significance powerful actors (and occasionally weak or marginal ones) found in them
or attached to them. The admirable pieces in Things That Talk include “Staging an
Empire” by Norton and Elaine Wise, about the Peacock Island near Potsdam,
where the most improbable and various sorts of imperial fantasias could be played
out in a safely delimited wonderland. Also wonderfully memorable is “News,
Paper, Scissors: Clippings in the Sciences and the Arts Around 1920” by Anke te
Heesen, a lucid account of the blurring of the line between news, art, and uncodable visual experience in the various uses made of newspaper clippings in the early
twentieth century. If space allowed, I would do more than allude to similarly
strong pieces in Things; for example, Charity Scribner’s terrific account, in “Object,
Relic, Fetish, Thing,” of Joseph Beuys’s relationship to East German material culture, or Peter Stallybrass and Ann Jones’s work on the dividing line between hands
and handled objects in “Fetishizing the Glove in Renaissance Europe.” And anyone who has followed with pleasure the debates about the significance of the rise
of automata that may have blurred the dividing line between objects and people
in Enlightenment Europe will be deeply impressed by the new account offered of
the consequences of convincing mechanical animalia detailed in Jessica Riskin’s
“The Defecating Duck, or, the Ambiguous Origins of Artificial Life.”
I did, though, find amid work that was by and large thorough and admirable
on its own terms precisely to the extent that it disavowed any transcendental or
decontextualizing force, three works that went further, dared more, and as a
result provoked both stronger reactions and deeper admiration. That I also found
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a few articles that dared more without result, that made claims insupportable
from their historical premises and incoherent in their philosophical underpinnings, is not surprising. But since the worst that can be said of such work is that
it engenders no useful further thought, either on account of its factual errors or
conceptual incoherence, why say more? I’d like to discuss, with as much attention to their divergences as possible, three articles that together encouraged me
to offer the account above, of thing theory as an approach to the margins of meaning: Geoffrey Batchen’s “Ere the Substance Fade: Photography and Hair Jewelry”
(in Photographs Objects Histories); Peter Galliston’s “Images of Self” (in Things That
Talk); and, finally, Stephen Best’s book, The Fugitive’s Properties.
What sort of things is thing theory good at explaining? Well, consider Charles De
Wolfe Brownell’s 1857 painting, “The Charter Oak.” The painting does not
merely depict that famous Hartford tree, but it also rests in a frame carved from
the wood of the tree itself. In fact, the frame itself contains minute carved representations of the oak as well. What we see in Hartford’s Wadsworth Athenaeum,
then, is a nested set of representations of the tree (carvings and painting), but it
is also the substance of the tree. So are we looking at image or essence—at a sign
for the thing, or the thing itself?
The painting I’m describing might seem nothing more than a curio, a Hartford one-off, did we not have a substantial new body of work that has begun to
investigate the curious doubleness that attaches to certain limit-case objects.
Geoffrey Batchen’s “Ere the Substance Fade: Photography and Hair Jewelry” provides a stunningly lucid account of how to theorize such a thing, an object that is
troubling because it is perched on the boundary between sign and substance.
Batchen does not begin by proclaiming an interest in the nature of the thing.
Indeed, his avowed intention is to force the field of photographic studies to take
seriously a Victorian culture oddity: that is, hair jewelry conjoined with photography. To the editors of Photographs Objects Histories, where his article appears,
this would seem reason enough. After all, the main purpose of this volume is to
remind us that photographs, too, are objects, embedded in cultural practice,
made out of certain mixtures of organic matter and heavy metals, of varying
degrees of durability, and so on.
However, Batchen’s work is manifestly thing theory nonetheless. He studies
Victorian photographs that were stored along with hair of the depicted person:
sometimes woven as jewelry, sometimes simply attached, in one case draped to
form a blonde wig over the photographed face of a departed soldier. Such photos appear to their viewers, Batchen contends, as something more than simple
symbolic objects, more than pieces of the material world that come to us already
marked up as signifiers, with a definite human meaning attached to them by way
of representation.
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Recall the Charter Oak painting with a frame actually made out of the Charter Oak: Batchen’s photographs edged with the actual hair represented in the
photos embody the same logic or illogic, the same artificial conjunction of Image
and “Reality.” Batchen quotes an advertising jingle (by studio photographer J. H.
Fitzgibbon of St. Louis, Missouri, in 1852) that perfectly elucidates the boundary status of these photographs: “secure the shadow ere the substance fade / let
nature copy that which nature made.” The point is that, like hair, the photograph
is in some sense consubstantial with the person depicted—this “shadow” is made
by nature, in direct contact with the now-absent person. Yet it is this very consubstantiality that makes it into not an object (which one might expect) but
rather a thing, since it is at once the essence of a person and yet at the same time
utterly material, devoid of all the spiritual qualities that an actual person would
have. The photograph, because it is the direct record of a bygone human life, thus
becomes at once more than an object—because it is partially human—and yet
also less than an object—because what is human in it is so intangible, so removed
from the zone where human interaction might take place.
It is worth noting that the attachment of hair jewelry to photographic images
created, in its day, little overt agitation. These were not radical transgressions
against the ordinary order of image etiquette, but rather extremely mainstream
indexes of how people chose to memorialize the absent or the dead. Batchen
argues that these hairy photos are crux points where the weakness of the guarantees of Truth show through and hence sites where people are forced to
redescribe what it is they are looking for in an art “object.” Conceptually and transcendentally, he may be right to emphasize the “deconstructive” force of these
hybrid image/substances, but historically the sheer ordinariness of this practice
is perhaps the most valuable reading clue we have. It is when such objects give
up their objecthood, when representations seem to lose their power to represent,
that there is glimpsed, beneath, a kind of bedrock assurance associated with the
thing that is no sign—not the art object, but the enduring thing that once was
human, or part of a human being. Of course this is odd: the fact of that bedrock’s
being trotted out—as woven jewelry, as a blonde wig draped over a photo—
would seem to be proof indeed, from a twenty-first-century standpoint, of how
alarming the world becomes when signs stop being signs, when objects are not
just objects to hand. And yet the reassurance, the nostalgic referent and the comfort that these photographs were evidently able to provide, is a valuable clue to
how the shifting space between representation and embodied object was successfully navigated during the early decades of photography—navigated in ways
that now to us seem almost irretrievably strange.
Peter Galliston, too, begins with objects so strange that the contemporary mind
is practically baffled in an effort to imagine how they could ever have seemed
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revelatory. Galliston has reconstructed the genesis and adolescence of the
Rorschach blot. He shows that the Swiss Jungian Herman Rorschach so wildly
succeeded with his blots because he produced an artifact that functioned as if it
contained no artifice at all.
Galliston’s article stems from the notion (which also shapes Lorraine Daston’s
insightful introduction, and colors to a greater or lesser extent all the other articles
in Things That Talk) that it is crucial to historicize the seemingly immutable boundaries that are visibly drawn between thing and person. That is, deliberating what
counts as an object, or a speaking object, and what counts as human attention to
that object is not a metaphysical project but a genealogical one, and the shifting
boundaries turn out to reveal shifting ideas about the location of selfhood and subjectivity. Galliston and Daston have, of course, been doing this sort of brilliant historiographic work for decades now, often collaboratively, so their success is
unsurprising; but I enjoy being redazzled by it, nonetheless.
By Galliston’s account, Rorschach’s insight, in his 1921 advocacy and distribution of a set of “Rorschach cards,” was that a “degree zero” of thingdom in the
form of ruthlessly engineered blots designed to evoke no “ordinary” human association would elicit from inside persons the true contents of their subjective
selves. “Not only did these cards talk; they did so in virtue of their form and color
down to the smallest detail. If the blots suggested even a shard of human design,
certain patients would seize on that fragment, losing their own ability to speak
from within. For this reason, nothing was more important to Rorschach than creating and reproducing cards that would register as undesigned designs” (271).
The crucial contribution of this account is that it locates the problem of the
“talking thing” not within the thing itself but at the vexed boundary between self
and world, where we are forced to articulate what kind of knowledge about the
world exists only within people and what knowledge is actually latent in the
world, waiting to be brought out. Galliston thus approaches afresh what is in a
certain sense the same problem that Marx’s account of dancing tables and the
“commodity fetish” brings out: deciding what is “contained” in objects involves
a series of prior, potentially ideological decisions about where you imagine
human labor or human thought residing. Thus by Marx’s account his contemporaries see as immanent within an object certain aspects of labor power that he
thinks rightly belong not to the object but to the person whose work brought that
object within the human economy.
By the 1920s there existed a strong model of a coherent inner self, knowable
only in its encounter with a “truly objective” outer world (objectivity is represented in the case of the blots by pure meaninglessness). Hence, a single test of
seemingly loquacious objective reality (Talk to the Blots!) was enough to elicit the
whole of the person inside. The Rorschach blot, says Galliston, works only if the
talkative object is so perfectly of the “objective” outer world that one can be sure
that no other human agency was there before one—what one says about the
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objects makes one’s encounter with the pure outsideness of the world in all its
delightful, and hence intensely meaning-laden, rigidity. “The [Rorschach blot
test] means that the functions of subjectivation (how subjects are formed) and
objectivation (how objects are formed) enter at precisely the same moment. To
describe the cards (on the outside) is exactly to say who you are (on the inside).”
The importance of Galliston’s reading resides in the close fit that the Rorschach
blots produce with other early-twentieth-century texts on what it might mean for
indisputably mute objects to “speak” the inner truth that they contain, to disgorge out of their abiding flatness some kind of depth that bespeaks the character of the people with whom they abide.
Fin-de-siècle sociologist Georg Simmel’s work on “adornment,” for example, also aspires to the telos of impersonality that Galliston maps in Rorschach’s
thinking. For Simmel, jewelry’s seductive appeal lies not in the diamond necklace’s capacity to conform to or flatter the particular, idiosyncratic beauty of the
face it frames, but rather the opposite. Our allegiance to our jewels, our capacity
to model ourselves upon the markers of prestige we have acquired, is the true
apotheosis of modern selfhood. Galliston’s work, then, helps us to uncover a very
different boundary from the one that Batchen maps with his doubly material and
representational photographs. These blots are objects that plumb the depths of
early-twentieth-century psyches exactly to the extent that they refuse interiority,
and mark their alignment with a material, objective, coldly impersonal world of
meaning located elsewhere. This paradigm is a helpful one in explaining the cultural success of everything from Freudianism to T. S. Eliot’s poetry, with its
“objective correlative” and its pseudo-magisterial footnotes.
Stephen Best’s The Fugitive’s Properties at first glance would seem hardly to consort
with these other approaches to thing theory at all. After all, Best’s own professed
goal is to articulate how contract and property evolve in nineteenth-century American jurisprudence: the underlying historical trajectory being, in his account, the
vitiation of the oft-invoked ideal of “equality” once it becomes clear that such equality is already conditioned by the willingness of the law to treat slaves as property—
and hence to continue to imagine even “inalienable” possessions like one’s voice or
one’s image as part and parcel of the same contractable property. In Best’s account
of his own work, then, what’s crucial is showing how American jurisprudence is
shaped by its own metaphors and tropes—and shaped, more crucially, by the
nonaccidental “instances” that underlie the evolution of property law—the way
that the assumptions of slavery continue to color property relations in all aspects of
American law (not just Jim Crow), even after the abolition of the Peculiar Institution. Where’s the thing theory in that?
The other articles I have been discussing are interested in what happens
when an object steps over a boundary and becomes a thing. But Best is largely
indifferent, like the legal tradition he studies, to the fate of special objects. He
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cares only what can be done, what has been done, to persons, and what the later
structural and “poetic” (meaning imaginative) consequences are of such treatment. And by Best’s account, the overworked, muted slave has not simply been
objectified, but thingified. To Best, that horrific thingification is most overtly registered in tort law. It is under the principle of tort, which elevates the importance
of property (and which can readily treat certain people as nothing more than
property), that slavery’s fully dehumanizing effects are most visible.
Best’s point—cloaked though it is in an intricate verbal joust with American
case law—is a cogent one. He wants to show that the effort required to figure
slaves as no more of a conceptual or legal problem than any other kind of property relation (tobacco, land, precious jewels, an education, etc.) requires an
excessive legal violence, a rupture that makes human beings not merely into
objects but into things.
Best’s work might almost be said to trace Galliston’s in a moral register: if the
point of the Rorschach blot is carefully to craft a set of blots that bear no trace of
the human upon them, you might say that the work of slavery-related case law
(and what congeries of judges, politicians, and interested parties is the ultimate
author of that corpus?) is to craft a description of human beings so that they seem
to retain nothing of the human about them. Pushed to the edge of cognition, their
existence is reduced, by a macabre set of legal precedents as sublimely disquieting as any poetic text, to a set of alienatable labor practices. And what that
macabre reduction suggests to Best is that even attributes that are a seemingly
inalienable part of one human being—my personality, my face, my voice, my talent—might also be thingified, turned into separable properties liable to transaction on the open market. The slavery of the whole body made into a thing, Best
argues, gives way to the serfdom of the human attribute made into a thing by
being parted from its host body.
In that final claim—that this logic of slavery comes to inform twentiethcentury logic of things and people in a contractualized modern capitalist state—
Best uses what might be seen as a striking variation on thing theory to raise a
quarrel with most accepted accounts of American legal history. Historians have
generally seen the new kinds of expropriation of property that emerge in the
Gilded Age and the early twentieth century as dependent on emergent contractual private law rather than dependent on the more innately dehumanizing
claims of slavery-tainted tort law. Best wants to insist on the lingering logic of
slavery’s thingification even in contract relations, which might seem inherently
to restore all people (who are responsible for signing their own contracts, after
all) to the status of negotiating subjects. By Best’s account, slavery’s tort logic leads
into, and even perhaps engenders, capitalism’s contract logic.
The connection Best works so hard to prove, however—between, for example, the discourse of slavery in Dredd Scott and the discourse of privacy rights in
Brandeis and Warren’s famous article “The Right to Privacy”—is not as clear as he
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wants it to be. The details of this debate are arcane at times and may seem historically specific, but they matter because it is so patently not clear, even today, exactly
what thumbprints the institution of slavery, and its particular application to black
people, has left on America’s law and its guiding economic and political ideologies.
Best’s move is to insist that the use of the law to destroy the possibility of black people appearing in public as persons ought actually to make us, as Stanley Fish and
other “neo-pragmatists” have argued, give up on the principle of equality itself. I
left the book unconvinced that it was the principle of equality that had been compromised by the dire story of American legal and constitutional complicity in slavery. Rather, the peculiar logic of slavery, especially when linked to the horrific
ideology of race difference that has so plagued the last two centuries in America and
Europe alike, enabled interested parties to evade the otherwise fundamental insight
that people are not things. The danger with Best’s approach is that it advocates jettisoning the only principles by which the concepts both of equality and of justice
can be maintained. The separation of people and things is in principle inextricable
from the logic of justice and equality both, and each undergirds the other. When
you lose your way distinguishing between people and things, you lose equality and
justice; but it’s also true that when you turn equality and justice into mere ad hoc
procedures, when you give up on their having any sort of transcendental force, you
lose the only strong reason not to allow the thingification of people.
In fact, one might challenge Best’s claim of historical causality (the “torts into
contracts” claim) to argue that the unsettling transformation of people into things
under the new legal dispensation of Gilded Age America lay in the rise of the very
“objectivation” that Galliston refers to. That is, the belief that there might be mechanistic determining “objective” structures through which people’s fates could be
determined and their legal autonomy systematically circumscribed actually derives
from a thorough undermining of American “equality” by way of newly corrupt contract logic, rather than via a persistent, insidious logic of slavery and concomitant
racism. Best documents two eras (the 1850s and the 1890s) when human beings
were made to look like mere inanimate and disposable things by the logic of a legal
system that abetted the worst sorts of oppression. What is most interesting about
the fin de siècle, though, is its affinity to the kind of creeping impersonality that Galliston documents, a modernist willingness to see particular attributes of people
available as detached bits and pieces rather than as coterminous with a singular life.
It should hardly need pointing out, however, that my even venturing to disagree
with Best on this historical point already indicates how far we are in agreement
about the basic terms by which “thingness” can appear an attribute even of human
beings—and how much I have learned from his admirable book about how the line
between subject and thing comes to be drawn.
How then to bring three such vivid and remarkable essays on thing theory back
together under one roof? What impresses me about the best work under review
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here is its interest in tracing not simply the movement of objects within the realm
of symbolic circulation, but the limit cases of different epochs and locations, the
examples that pushed and pulled at the problem of where an object’s “meaning”
ended and its “materiality” began. The three works I have discussed have very different notions of what causes such a conceptual problem. In Stephen Best’s book
about the logic that turned slaves not only into possessions but also into things,
the question is political: how does such morally abominable logic of thingification persist into latter-day America? To Peter Galliston, the question for
Rorschach blots is about how modernists understood the psyche, or the idea of
a “deep” human subject. And for Geoffrey Batchen, who is more overtly deconstructive, the point is to trace the Victorian exploration of how a photograph
might be both a representation of its subject and in some sense a literal extension
of that subject—a “nature-made” image that thus has the same Nature as that
which it depicts.
What all three authors share, however, is a commitment to articulating the
boundary conditions under which both objects and people start to strike one as
RAT-TAT-TATs or thingamabobs. At its best, then, it seems to me that thing theory must remain not so much inter-disciplinary (that suggests a boundary at
which two different idea systems may meet) as extra-disciplinary. That is, its job
should consist of noting the places where any mode of acquiring or producing
knowledge about the world runs into hard nuts, troubling exceptions, or blurry
borders—of anatomizing places where the strict rules for classifying and comprehending phenomena seem suddenly no longer to apply. Lacunae like these cry
out for thing theory.
Brandeis University

